State of Utah v. Gregory Hunter  : Reply to Brief in Opposition by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Gregory Hunter : Reply to Brief in
Opposition
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; J. Kevin Murphy; Assistant Attorney General.
Kathryn D. Kendell; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Utah;
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Hunter, No. 920246.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4207
v n i 
45.9 
,S9 
DOCKET NO 
LRluF 
s=p c^-tlb 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Petitioner/Defendant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/P1 ai nt i f f , 
Priority No. ll 
Case No. 910319-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff/Appeilant, 
v. 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
1>B 7 n 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KATHRYN D. KENDELL 
Staff Attorney 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION OF UTAH 
Boston Building Suite 419 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
F I L E D 
JUN 2 3 1992 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Pet itioner/Defendant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Plainti ff, 
Priority No. 11 
Case No. 910319-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint iff/Appellant, 
v. 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KATHRYN D. KENDELL 
Staff Attorney 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION OF UTAH 
Boston Building Suite 419 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Petitioner/Defendant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Plaintiff, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti ff/Appellant, 
v. 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The opposition brief filed by respondent raises issues 
which petitioner seeks to briefly clarify. 
I. THE ANALYSIS OF STATE V. LAROCCO IS NOT LIMITED TO 
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES. 
Respondent argues that this Court's decision in State 
v. Larocco, 794 P2d 460 (1990), applies only "in the limited 
context of automobile searches." (Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition p.7). This assertion is erroneous. The Larocco 
opinion painstakingly details the application of State and 
Federal constitutional provisions to the area of search and 
seizures generally. Id. 465-67. The opinion notes that U.S. 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourth Amendment generally, 
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and automobile searches in particular, is a source of much 
confusion. Id. 466. The Court explicitly recognizes that an 
individual's expectation of privacy is the threshold for Article 
I, Section 14 applicability and reiterates that once such an 
expectation is established a warrant or exigent circumstances 
must be present. 
If this analysis is appropriate in the context of an 
automobile, such protections surely exist in the context of home 
or apartment searches. To the extent respondent argues that the 
carefully drawn protections outlined in State v. Larocco are 
inapplicable to an individuals home or apartment, respondent is 
wrong. 
II. THE ANALYSIS OF NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O. IS NOT APPLICABLE 
TO THE PARTICIPATION OF A POLICE OFFICER IN THE SEARCH. 
Respondent relies on New Jersey v. T.L.O 469 U.S. 325 
(1985) for the apparent proposition that the participation in 
this search by a police officer was insignificant. T.L.O. 
involved a High School student whose purse was searched by a 
vice-principal. There was no police involvement whatsoever in 
the search or investigation. T.L.O. is clearly not this case and 
any implication as to how the Court would have treated the 
involvement of police is purely speculative. The search here did 
in fact involve a police officer from its inception. The 
authority relied on by Hunter in his main brief is relevant and 
directly on point. Officer Steven Milne is not a public school 
official or merely a state actor. He is a police officer within 
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the jurisdiction of the Utah State University campus and vested 
with ail powers of any law enforcement official. Under these 
circumstances, absolute adherence to the Fourth Amendment and 
Article 1, Section 14 principles and protections is required M.J. 
v. State of Florida, 399 So. 2d 996 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981). The 
Court of Appeals, contrary to the assertion by respondent, did 
not adequately analyze the involvement of Officer Milne and the 
fact that such involvement mandated conformance with the fourth 
amendment and Article 1, Section 14 protections. 
III. ANY LEGITIMATE UNIVERSITY PURPOSE FOR THE SEARCH WAS 
INVALIDATED BY THE SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF MR. 
HUNTER. 
Respondent devotes a substantial portion of its 
opposition brief to the proposition that the search in question 
was initiated for University purposes and therefore lawful. 
However, the search of Mr. Hunter's dormitory room did not 
uncover evidence of any activity which lead officials to conduct 
the search in the first place. Instead, the search of Hunter's 
room discovered allegedly stolen items wholly unrelated to the 
alcohol abuse and dormitory vandalism which provided the apparent 
need for the search. A rule allowing a University to articulate 
an arguably "university purpose" for a search which then results 
in criminal prosecution for activity entirely unrelated to the 
search purpose invites abuse. At the very least, the University 
should be required to confine any disciplinary action or penalty 
to that related to the conduct sought to be proscribed. If 
indeed a search is conducted to discover evidence of dormitory 
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and alcohol use, the outcome of such a search must comport with 
its purposes. 
Da ted this ^ ° day of June, 1992 
Respectfully submitted, 
(A-pUiQ 
KATHRYN D.^KENDELL 
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